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ABSTRACT
This thesis questions which would be a valid approach for building design ma-
chine aided by computational intelligence capable of generating surprises for
their designers-observers. There have been efforts since the 1960s towards
developing frameworks for design machines that were envisioning compu-
tational systems as something more than tools for efficient production and
representation. Some of them were dealing with design problems as complex
systems that needed to be broken down in modular parts, for example Chris-
topher Alexander's "Notes on the Synthesis of Form". However such strategies
were associated with explicit languages of descriptions and strong hierarchies,
defined in advance by the designer, that were constraining the design space to
what these predefined descriptions were anticipating.
This thesis draws its motivation from the work of Professor of Design and Com-
putation George Stiny on visual computations operating on non-fixed sets of
primitives, as well as from research conducted in the field of Artificial Intel-
ligence on alternative representations. I will propose a framework for a design
machine highlighting the importance of it being able to generate its own dy-
namic descriptions, "entities" that bear content independent of the interpre-
tations of their designers. Inspired by a computational system, developed by
Stephen Larson (2003), capable of grounding its own symbols in perception, I
will experiment with self-organizing map algorithms suggesting them as a pos-
sible way for a design machine to build up and update its language of descrip-
tion from its perceptual information.
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Thesis Reader: Takehiko Nagakura
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Introduction
[a] How everything started
I was always attracted to design examples that were experimenting with form.
I was impressed with the novelty hidden in the ability of the designers to look
at everyday things in a different way. For example, what inspires a designer
to project in a simple folded paper the concept of a continuous architectural
envelope?
Figure 1: New ways to look at things
Sometimes I caught myself looking around, searching for elements, patterns,
and formations in my everyday environment that could motivate me to con-
ceptualize form in a different, novel way. Soon I carried this expectation into
my interaction with the digital design tools I was using. I could run a small
script and then observe what kind of transformations occurred; sometimes
the results were beyond my expectation and in fact I could identify in the gen-
erated visual forms "new" ways to inhabit space.
One of my recent projects, during which I was developing an algorithm to gen-
erate spiraling patterns, fed my curiosity. I started questioning myself: why, in-
stead of directly modeling a surface in the 3d environment where I could apply
my spiraling generator script, did I prefer to play with random number patterns
that would drive my surface geometry? Was this making me less of a designer?
Was I handing over to the computer the agency to design instead of me?
In retrospect, I think I was trying to convert my script to a "black box." I wanted
to introduce to the system elements beyond my understanding that would
generate unexpected results, different from my sometimes fixed patterns of
knowledge and thought, results that would motivate me to recognize new for-
mal relationships.
[b] Thesis outline
The body of this thesis is formed by four sections. The greater question that
runs through these four sections is whether and how our digital computational
design "partners" could be generators of surprises for their designers-observ-
ers.
There have been efforts since the 1960's towards developing frameworks for
design machines that were dealing with design problems as complex systems
that needed to be broken down in modular parts with the objective to de-
velop new methods of design and gain a better understanding of the design
process. Other efforts were aiming at building architecture machines aided by
computational intelligences that could facilitate a creative human-computer
interaction. Section 2 briefly traces some of these efforts and discusses why
some of these approaches were against the nature of design and against the
emergence of novelty.
Section 3 argues that surprise is a driving force in the design process. It dis-
cusses the concept of a "black box" machine and forms the hypothesis that by
regarding our design machines as black boxes we set the conditions for them
to generate surprises that will motivate the design process. By highlighting
some fundamental characteristics of the design process, at the third part of
the section, a computational framework for a design machine that introduces
surprise as its criterion is developed.
Section 4 outlines a classification of machines, discussing the concepts of a
receptor machine, an effector machine, a reaction machine, a memory ma-
chine and finally a machine that forms intrinsic representations. It questions
the "eligibility" of each of them as a possible design machine concluding that
intrinsic descriptions are a step that can take the concept of a design machine
to a higher level.
Section 5 moves a step forward towards a machine that can form intrinsic de-
scriptions by inquiring how a machine can algorithmically decompose a phe-
nomenon into discrete parts. Revisiting the research work of Stephen Larson I
propose the use of self-organizing maps (SOM) algorithm as the infrastructure
for the design machine. I demonstrate an introductory example run of an SOM
algorithm built to organize fragments of a two dimensional input image.
PART 01
[a] Historical background
Since the appearance of computer-aided design in architecture in the 1960s,
there have been efforts towards developing frameworks for design machines,
which envisioned computational tools as something more than simple tools
for efficient production and representation. There has been a critical mass of
people, who saw in digital computational tools the possibility of developing
new methods of design. Some were intrigued by the chance of figuring out
what was going on in the earliest design phases, in order to further improve
and support the design process. Others, considering design simply as a form of
information processing, were seeing computers as the mean to develop tech-
niques for dealing with great amounts of information and for ordering and
reordering it into useful subsets of manageable data.
A characteristic example is Christopher Alexander's (1964) book Notes on the
Synthesis of Form, on a systematic design method based on decomposing a
complex network of interacting design requirements into independent sub-
systems. Alexander and its research group regarded the decomposition of
complicated design issues in a systematic way, not only as a chance to solve a
design problem but also as a source for producing innovative solutions (Milne,
1975, p. 32). Some years later, trying to overcome some of the inconsistencies
and mistakes of Alexander's programs Murray Milne built CLUSTR, a compu-
tational system meant to assist the designer at the beginning of the design
process "in finding the structure inherent in his design problem" (Milne, 1971,
p.242). Once the designer has supplied to the system the elements that define
his design problem and their relationships, the computer generated reorgani-
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zations of these elements. Milne (1975) built CLUSTR with the aspiration that
the reorganization generated by the system would provide a solution that for
the designer "would be completely new" (p. 35).
Another important contribution to the research on design machines was the
work of the Architecture Machine Group, founded in 1967 at MIT by Nicho-
las Negroponte. The group was focusing its research efforts on "architecture
machines", a term allocated by Negroponte (1970) to an artificial intelligence
that "assisted, augmented and eventually replicated" architectural design pro-
cesses. Negroponte (1970) in his book The Architecture Machine: Toward a
more Human Environment states that computer-aided design cannot occur
without machine intelligence. He envisions architecture machines that can be
active partners, intelligent, capable of learning and improving over time; able
to solicit information on their own, to acquire experiences and to understand
human idiosyncrasies. They should be able to interrupt the designer's train of
thought and to take initiative to do things as "remind, stimulate, reprimand,
caution, or even abort action" (Negroponte, 1970).
< Figure 3: URBAN5 Architecture Machine Group
Snapshot of the conversation between the de-
signer and the machine.
A Figure 4: LEARN, Architecture Machine Group
The configurations of cubes on the left were two
of the archetypes input to the system, the one on
the right is a solution generated by the system.
SHADOW SHOULD NOT EXCSED
The group implemented various design systems - LEARN, MEMORY, GROPE,
URBAN5 to name a few. LEARN was a "computer mannerist"; it observed the
designer's activities and was generating its own solutions. MEMORY was an
information storage and retrieval system with "forgetting convenience". Over
time the system could classify events either as strong remembrances or fainter
recollections. Consequently, as time passes the responses of the system were
gaining meaning with respect to its input. URBAN5 was a design machine that
was conversing with a designer on an environmental design project. The sys-
tem through a central attention mechanism "listens" to the designer, always
giving him the opportunity to change his mind or restate a situation at any
time.
I will close this brief historical survey with the framework for an autonomous
system for creating designs, outlined by George Stiny and Lionel March (1981)
in their paper "Design Machines". Having as a starting point Franz Rouleaux's
argument that design (invention) is thought, they elaborate Kenneth Craik's
schema for thought into a schema for design. According to Craik (1943) thought
involves three essential processes: "translation" of external processes into
words, numbers or symbols, arrival at other symbol's by process of reason-
ing, deduction, inference and "retranslation" of these symbols into external
processes. Their framework divides the design process into four mechanisms:
receptor, effector, language of designs, and design theory. The receptor cre-
ates representations of external conditions and the effector stimulates exter-
nal processes or artifacts from designs.
12. 3
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Figure 5: Kenneth Craik's schema for thought, base for the
proposed framework for design machines by Stiny & March.
[b] Framing the problem
Computers have come to play an important role in architectural prac-
tice. Nonetheless, the promise of computation as a creative partner
in practice, and a means to better understand and support the design
process has yet to be realized.
George Stiny, Terry Knight (2001)
Christopher Alexander and others who approached the study of design meth-
ods through the use of computational systems, started with the hope that by
writing computer programs they could capture the moment of novelty and
creative insight a designer experiences in the design process. However, the ex-
periments on systematic design methods included strategies associated with
explicit languages of descriptions and strong hierarchies that were constrain-
ing the design space to what these predefined descriptions were anticipating.
Relevant discussion can be found in Ivan Sutherland's paper "Structure in
Drawings and the Hidden-surface Problem". Sutherland (1975) reflecting on
Sketchpad, the first computer-aided design program, writes that to a large ex-
tent the usefulness of computer drawings is their structured nature (p.75).
However the need for structure and hierarchy stands in opposition to the na-
ture of the design process. Stiny (2006) in agreement with Sutherland's point
writes:
The difficulty in making computer drawings is their structured nature. It's hard
- no it's impossible to tell what constituents to draw without foreknowledge.
That's the trick - not to need foreknowledge so that the properties of com-
puter drawings can alter freely to correspond with the properties of anything
they're used to describe. (p. 135)
The designer looking for potential values during the design process is free at
every step to decompose and reorganize anew the elements that characterize
his evolving artifact. There is no structure or hierarchy for him to remember;
there is no fixed representation and vocabularies. For Sutherland (1975) a de-
signer is concerned only with drawings as the representations of the evolving
design, as "dirty marks on paper" (p. 75). On the other hand, the behavior of a
drawing produced in a computer is "critically dependent upon the topological
and geometric structure built up in the computer memory as a result of draw-
ing operations" (p. 75).
Since Sketchpad, a wide range of computational tools has been developed that
successfully address isolated aspects of design like analysis, fabrication, evalu-
ation etc. This segmentation of the design process reveals the constraints of
our digital design tools as far as the early stage of design is concerned, while
the accuracy and speed of computers can be efficiently exploited for the later
design phases.
It has to be mentioned though, that during the last two decades, there have
been some new efforts to implement digital computational mechanisms in the
early design stage. Such an example is the use of genetic algorithms in which a
host of outside criteria not given directly in the rules of the algorithm plays an
important role in the outcomes (Knight & Stiny, 2001). Knight and Stiny (2001,
p.360) classify this type of computation as non-classical in process because the
rules on which it operates are not fully understandable. Very often the out-
comes of such processes are observed as unexpected and surprising by their
designers. However even these cases still involve the need from the side of the
designer to fix his way of "seeing" and explicitly define in advance the vocabu-
laries of the computation. From that point on the machine just searches and
generates solutions.
To sum up, what this thesis identifies as a problem is the need in a digital com-
putation for the designer to fix a priori his primitive units of descriptions and
to define the hierarchy by which these primitives are related. In other words,
he should have understood very well how the computation will operate. But
then there is no space left for surprises. Designers want to regard their com-
putational design tools as creative partners in design, as open processes that
generate opportunities for ambiguity and surprises. Francois Roche's (2009)
quote is indicative of this desire:
Machines are always pretending to do more than what they were pro-
grammed to do. It's their nature. Their behavior alternates phantasms,
frustrations and fears inspired by their own ability to break free and
threaten us...These multiple disorders, this kind of schizophrenia, could
be considered a tool for reopening processes and subjectivities, for re
protocolizing indeterminacy and uncertainties. Misunderstandings, in
this sense, produce artifacts ... and apparatus can be considered gener-
ators of ambiguity and knowledge where non shaping protocols, pro-
tocols that emerge, contingently reveal the conditions of emission ...
If it is to envision digital design systems as generators of surprises and unpre-
dictable results, we have to understand that it is necessary even for us that
design them to regard them as black boxes. By the end of the thesis I will have
demonstrated that a possible approach is building design machines able to
sense their environment and to build their own descriptions out of their per-
ceptual information.
Before moving to the next chapter, I would like to clarify that the decision
to research on autonomous design systems did not originate from the belief
that the designer should be removed out of the loop. It rather adopts Yona
Friedman's standpoint that a "machine" does not become a machine except
because of the user. No "machine" could be imagined that does not "contain"
an intelligent observer (Negroponte, 1975, p. 93-94). Friedman mentions:
I do not consider the "hardware" machine (or even the "hardware +
software" machine) as the machine. I consider as "machine" only and
exclusively a system containing "the machine and me".
His arguments signify a "machine" composed of two "submachines". The first
is the "real world and the computer" and the second "the user and the com-
puter". This thesis' interest lies on the first of the two. It looks for the proper-
ties that would constitute this submachine capable of generating the condi-
tions for the observer-designer to encounter surprise.
PART 02 Surprise as a design criterion
This section comprises of three chapters. The central theme of the section is
the element of surprise. The first chapter inquiries how surprise can be intro-
duced as a criterion in a design machine by exploring the concept of a "black
box". The second chapter attempts to explain why surprise is a driving force in
the design process. Having highlighted the importance of surprise in design,
the third chapter identifies the singular characteristics that would allow a de-
sign machine to act as a "black box" thus as generator of surprises. By the end
of part 3 1 will have outlined a framework of a design machine which includes
surprise as its design criterion.
[a] Defining the "black box"
What is behind the curtain?
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Marvin Minsky (1967) uses the term black box to describe how a machine can
be regarded from the point of view of the user or the environment as a closed
box with input and output channels. From time to time the user acts on the
machine through the input channels, and from time to time the machine acts
on the user through the output channels. The user doesn't normally need to
know just what really takes place inside the box. "That is, unless he is particu-
larly interested in understanding the "works" of the machine, or in modifying
it, he needs to know only what are its "input-output" properties" (Minsky,
1976, p.13).
output
black-box
input
Figure 6: Themachine as a black box to the outside observer
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that by regarding our design machines
as black boxes we set the conditions for them to generate surprises that will
motivate the design process. To understand how a "black box" can creatively
contribute in an interaction we have to think this interaction in terms of a con-
versation. According to Ranulph Glanville (1997) conversation is a mechanism
that allows us to communicate through ignorance - ignorance of what a per-
son is thinking and of how that relates to their chosen form of representation.
Let me clarify the argument through an analogy used by Michael Reddy (1993,
p.171-176), called the toolmakers paradigm. The toolmakers paradigm starts
from the assumption that people are living isolated in slightly different envi-
ronments. He depicts this situation as a wagon wheel where each pie-shaped
sector represents a different environment. The two spokes and a part of the
circumference form the walls of each environment. There is no way for the
people to visit each other's environment or exchange samples of the things
they construct. The only means of communication between them is a device
that exists at the hub of the wheel by which they exchange crude sets of in-
structions on how to make things helpful for living. In this analogy the content
of each environment represents each person's unique set of thoughts, feelings
and perceptions. In the communication described in this paradigm, very often
partial miscommunications and divergence of readings occur. However, the
constant interaction and the effort provided by people to communicate and
exchange information on their different backgrounds result in important prog-
ress in the quality of their living.
Figure 7: The toolmakers paradigm
0 C A, B, C and D are living in isolated environ-
ments and communication is allowed only
through the device at the hub of the wheel
The precondition in Reddy's paradigm for these miscommunications to occur
is the "isolated" environments in which each person lives. What is going on in
the mind and the world of person A is black box for person B; A and B stand at
a "distance" in terms of how they perceive and understand the world. This dis-
tance is what makes it possible for person A or person B to receive a response
that will offer different interpretations, variations or even produce surprises
-unexpected outcomes that do not fit in their categories of knowing and pat-
terns of thought.
The distance among the two parts is what Glenville (1997) calls the interface
that allows us to remain ignorant yet still to interact. He writes that everything
that has happened has happened between the observer and the black box
and nothing is entirely of the one or the other. The communication is in the
between. Moving back to the realm of design and our digital computational
tools, when the designer writes code he assures that the computational sys-
tem will "see" his own understanding of the world; therefore the in between
distance shrinks. The vocabularies and structure that drive the computation
have to be made explicit in advance. No "space" is left for misinterpretations
and surprises.
If it is to envision digital computational systems as creative partners in design,
we have to understand that we have to build the conditions for them to act as
generators of surprise.
{b] Positioning surprise in design
I believe that surprise is a driving force in design. I designate the moment of
surprise in the design process when the designer encounters the "unexpect-
ed"; in other words, the moment when in the eyes of the designer, the ap-
peared form comes to be different from the expected form. By expected form,
I mean any current organization of matter and information - described by the
defining constraints and instantaneous forces that control the evolving arti-
fact - that is either known or can be easily predicted by the designer-observer.
Surprise resides in the appearance of reorganization and the emergence of
features that stand in opposition to the artifact's current defining character.
Donald A. Sch6n (1987, p.28) defines as surprise an unexpected outcome,
pleasant or unpleasant, produced by routine responses, that does not fit the
categories of our knowing-in-action. Inherent in a surprise is the fact that it
gets our attention.
The aspiration of being surprised by the "new" and unexpected leads the de-
signer to a successive reinterpretation and restructuring of the design repre-
sentations, which moves forward the design process. He is constantly seek-
ing potential values in the evolving design while trying to balance a number
of implicit or explicit criteria, looking forward to the moment of the creative
leap. This moment of creative insight is defined by Murray Milne (1975, p.32)
as "the sudden and spontaneous reorganization of previously dissimilar ele-
ments into an integrated whole, which the designer believes is different from
everything else he has known before."
The designer is involved in a fluid and spontaneous mode of production; what
constitutes this process as dynamic and fluid is the designer's freedom at any
step to distinguish a new potential value, change his mind and focus on some-
thing else. This reinterpretation and restructuring of design representations is
a fundamental property of design thinking. This property is facilitated by the
interaction between the designer and the visual representations of the design
artifact. When for example a designer sketches, he awaits the emergence con-
cepts, ideas, and things with potential values. Designers therefore have a dy-
namic relationship with their sketches, where each perceived aspect suggests
a move or alteration for the next sketch. Emergence or unexpected discovery
refers to the creation of unanticipated, new ideas in response to visual cues
from an existing sketch.
It is necessary to highlight at this point that surprise is not the agency of the vi-
sual representation. The detection of the "new" or "unexpected" is subjective
and depends on the eye of the designer who is involved in the process. When
the observer ascribes the quality of surprise to a phenomenon, he can only do
this in terms of his own understanding.
[c] Opening the "black box"
In this chapter, I will identify characteristics that I consider fundamental for
a design machine. The objective is always to define these elements that will
make it possible for the machine to be regarded as a black box from its de-
signer's point of view. As explained so far this is the precondition for surprises
to emerge in the in-between space of the designer and the machine.
I have previously referred to the design process as a fluid and spontaneous
mode of production where the "new" emerges out of the dynamic interaction
of the designer with its evolving artifact. To illustrate my point I will look at the
artist Jackson Pollock and the mode of production he followed for his painting
"Autumn Rhythm". Pollock is an indicative example of an artist who builds a
dynamic relation with his artifact. As Robert Goodnough (1951) states, Pollock
is not concerned with representing preconceived ideas in his paintings. He is
rather concerned
with being involved in an experience of paint and canvas, directly,
without interference from the suggested forms and colors of existing
objects. The nature of the experience is important. It is not something
that has lost contact with reality, but might be called a synthesis of
countless contacts which have become refined in the area of the emo-
tions during the act of painting.
The actions of the painter are a black box for an outside observer and some-
times for the painter himself. As Donald Sch6n (1987, p.28) argues the know-
ing is in the action; it is tacit and spontaneously delivered without conscious
deliberation. I will attempt to "open" the black box of the artist's actions by
observing a series of film frames from a black and white film by Hans Namuth
(Karmel, 1999) which depict the artist at work, offering a significant insight of
the process Pollock is following.
We have an observer, the artist and an object of observation, his canvas. Pol-
lock looks at the white canvas and chooses the area on which he is going to ap-
4Figure 8: Jackson Pollock at work for the painting "Autumn Rythm." These frames
are indicative of Pollock's dynamic relationship with his canvas.
ply a certain kind of organization. He selects his primitive units of descriptions
- in this case his materials and his mode of expression, either a brush stroke or
a mark or a drip etc -and he applies a transformation on the canvas (Verbeeck,
2006). Once he has applied the transformation he perceives the phenomenon
again; he is left with the choice of how to continue the painting. He is free to
select the same or a new area of intervention on the evolving painting and the
same or new primitive units of description.
Simon (as cited in Stiny, 2006, p. 138) explains how each implementation cre-
ates a new situation. Every organization applied on the canvas provides a con-
tinuing source of new ideas to the painter. The same sequence of actions is
performed over and over again in a recursive process during which the artist
observes and interacts every time with the evolving artifact - phenomenon.
Pollock's example substantiate Simon's argument (as cited in Stiny, 2006, p.
138) that the act of painting is "a process of cyclical interaction between paint-
er and canvas in which current goals lead to new applications of paint, while
the gradually changing pattern suggests new goals."
Feature 1: Intrinsic descriptions
Designers need an involvement with the sensory aspects of our physi-
cal environment and is not difficult to imagine that their machine part-
ners need a similar environment.
Yona Friedman (1975, p.93)
One characteristic feature of the artistic mode of production is that during
action remains undetermined what drives the choices of the artist. The art-
ist is forming intrinsic representations. An intrinsic representation is a way of
describing things that is subject to the eye of the beholder; there is no one-to-
one correspondence between a phenomenon and an intuitive understanding
of it. Donald A. Sch6n (1987, p.25) in Educating the Reflective Practitioner,
defines these descriptions as constructions, attempts to put into explicit, sym-
bolic form a kind of intelligence that begins by being tacit and spontaneous.
Similarly Stephen Larson (2003), in his thesis Intrinsic Representation: Boot-
strapping Symbols from Experience, states that an intrinsic representation
seeks to generate explicit symbols from implicit representational systems that
will have an inherent meaning to that system.
The intrinsic nature of these representations relates to the fact that they car-
ry their meaning along with them, rather than having their meaning given to
them by another system. Therefore, the ability to form intrinsic descriptions
presupposes interaction with the outside world, the environment where the
phenomenon, the evolving artifact takes place. In the Pollock example the in-
teraction between the artist and his canvas is evident in Pollock's words: "Hav-
ing a canvas on the floor, I feel nearer, more a part of the painting. This way I
can walk around it, work from all four sides and be in the painting, similar to
the Indian sand papers of the West."
Designers also need the sensory involvement with their physical environment.
Yona Friedman (1975, p.93) recognizes a similar need for the digital design
tools. Supporting the same point, Negroponte (1970) writes in the introduc-
tion of the book The Architecture Machine:
A design machine must have an artificial intelligence because any de-
sign procedure, set of rules, or truism is tenuous, if not subversive,
when used out of context or regardless of context. It follows that a
mechanism must recognize and understand the context before car-
rying out an operation. Therefore a machine must be able to discern
changes in meaning brought about by changes in context, hence, be
intelligent. (p.1)
Negroponte (1970) further supports his argument by highlighting that a ma-
chine not capable of forming its own intrinsic descriptions, but having instead
the designer's personal "prejudices and distortions" and preconceived views
of the world embedded in its system, would never offer a challenging environ-
ment to the machine-designer partnership.
For a design machine to be able to interact with the outside world should be
equipped with sets of sensors, effectors and processors to view the real world
directly and indirectly. Negroponte (1970) identifies two ways of contact of the
machine with the world. The first is direct sensory information that passes into
the machine through observation channels. The possibility of the machine to
challenge and surprise is facilitated by the difficulty of the designer to com-
pletely control the data the machine collects. The second way of contact, that
Negroponte (1970) proposes, is the information the machine could collect by
eventually observing the representations of the designer.
The value of the second case does not lie on the possibility of building a ma-
chine adaptive to the methods and activities of his designer but on the pos-
sibility of the machine to contribute creatively to the conversation that takes
place between itself and the designer. As mentioned before, the space where
surprises can be observed is the in-between among the two members of a
conversation.
Feature 2: Dynamic Vocabularies
Architecture, unlike a game with fixed rules and a fixed number of
pieces, and much like a joke, determined by context, is the croquet
game in Alice in Wonderland where the Queen of Hearts keeps chang-
ing the rules.
Nicholas Negroponte (1970)
The painting process of Pollock can be regarded as a computation. Pollock
works his paintings by going through the same four schemas in a given se-
quence over and over again. In each sequence the artist chooses a frame of
intervention on the canvas, applies a transformation, evaluates its outcome
and removes the view frame (Verbeeck, 2006). This sequence of steps does
not define how a gesture finds its form on the canvas. The artist's primitive
units of expression are not defined a priori. He is free every time he applies a
transformation to reflect on the entire painting and to choose anew his units
of description.
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The design process can be also considered as a kind of informal computation
in which designs are transformed into other designs by adding, erasing or re-
drawing shapes (Knight, 2003, p.130). In the same way as described in the case
of Pollock at every step of the process the designer "may recognize entirely
new and unanticipated, emergent shapes in a design, and then use them in
subsequent transformations of the design" (Knight, 2003, p.130). This free-
dom of the designer to change at any given moment the way of looking at
things shows how the design process operates on sets of parts or primitives of
the design that are dynamic, are continuously changing.
Surprise is very closely associated with emergence. Therefore a valid frame-
work for a design machine that can generate surprises would involve the con-
cept of emergence. Having explained the importance of changing vocabularies
in the design process, the proposed framework for a design machine embrac-
es the kind of emergence that becomes possible by computations that operate
on non fixed sets of primitives.
Primitives are the elemental parts into which a system or an object is decom-
posed. A primitive has no internal parts of structure and cannot be construct-
ed from combinations of the other entities from the perspective of that sys-
tem. A representation in a computation has to do with the set of primitives
the computation depends on and how these are combined. Knight and Stiny
(2001) have classified computation in terms of the aspect of representation 1.
A computation classical in representation operates on fixed sets of primitives
and explicit definitions of how they are combined, while a computation non-
classical in representation operates without fixed units and primitives (Knight
& Stiny, 2001).
1. In their paper Classical and Non-Classical Computation, Knight and Stiny (2003) clas-
sify four types of computation applying the classical/non classical distinction on two
aspects of computation, representation and process. For the scope of the current the-
sis I am interested in the distinction provided when taking into account only the aspect
of representation.
In a computation that is "classical in representation", emergence may arise
from combinations of pre-existing fixed sets of primitives. On the other hand,
in a computation "non-classical in representation" , emergence may arise by
the creation of new kinds of primitives. These two modes of production
provide two ways for describing and understanding change and cre-
ativity: as the unfolding consequences of fixed combinatorial rules on
bounded sets of pre-defined primitives or as new processes and inter-
actions that come into play over time to define new primitives (Cariani,
2006).
Stiny (2006, 1998) with his work on shape grammars offers a unique insight in
the way novelty can occur when a computation operates on non fixed set of
primitives. Shape Grammars is a visual computational system that does design
directly through computation on shapes. At every step, the rules are applied
on shapes not explicitly defined by either the author or the user of the gram-
mar. A rule can be used to compute many different designs by applying or not
applying it to different shapes in a computation. As Stiny (2006, p.53) writes
in his book Shape: Talking about Seeing and Doing calculating with shapes re-
quires no parsing of shapes into fixed parts. Ambiguity is always present in
such a visual calculation as the compositional units can be recombined and
decomposed in different ways. The novelty ambiguity brings makes creative
design possible.
Everything fuses and divides in between. The real secret to calculating
with shapes is to see that there's always something new. No matter
what I do, it's a surprise. What you see is what you get (Stiny, 2006,
p.59).
Figure 9:
Operating on non-fixed
sets of primitives.
[d] A framework for a design machine
The cyclical process described in the example of Pollock and later extended to
the design process can be depicted by the diagram of figure 9. The observer -
designer looks at the phenomenon, the evolving design and decides on how
he wants to decompose it into parts. He forms intrinsic descriptions meaning-
ful to him.
The produced vocabulary is further manipulated, transforming the evolving
artifact. After a step of transformations the parts of the artifact fuse back to
form the new state of the phenomenon. The designer observes the current
state of the phenomenon and he decomposes it into the same or new descrip-
tions. This recursive process continues until the designer decides that the state
of the artifact is satisfactory.
The two singular features that were pointed out as essential to be introduced
to the framework for the design machine is the intrinsic nature of the descrip-
tions formed by the designer and the ability of this cyclical process to operate
on non fixed units of description.
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Figure 10: Cyclical process of interaction among designer and evolving design
If the human observer/designer is replaced by a machine, then we have to
input to the machine hand-crafted knowledge about the world expressed in
some knowledge representation language. From that point, on reasoning is
separated from perception and action. The languages of descriptions are fixed
and the artifact can only be a product of combinations and transformations of
the primitive elements of the language. This framework describes most of the
current computational design tools that designers use.
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Figure 11: When the observer is replaced by a computer the
open and dynamic set of vocabularies depicted in diagram of
figure 10 becomes closed and static. The system comes to be
completely disembodied from the outside world.
The proposed computational framework wants the design machine equipped
with receptors, sensory mechanisms that enable the system to sense its en-
vironment continuously. The machine can decompose the observed phenom-
enon to discrete parts and generate its own descriptions. Transformations are
applied on the generated symbols and an artifact is produced. At next step
the machine can look back at the artifact and generate the same or new sets
of descriptions. New transformations are applied on the evolving artifact and
the process happens recursively. To summarize, the suggested computational
framework operates on dynamic descriptions.
The word dynamic has to do:
> with the ability of the machine to interact with the outside
world through a cyclical process, forming descriptions that
bear content independent of the interpretations of their de-
signers.
> with the ability of the machine to operate on vocabularies
that do not belong to a closed, static set but they could be
constantly changing.
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Figure 12: Proposed framework for a design machine oper-
ating on dynamic descriptions.
PART 03 On machines
[a] About representation
We are surrounded by a wide range of machines that vary from being physi-
cal and mechanical, for example bulldozers that restructure our environment,
to being completely symbolic and disembodied from the outside world, like
chess-playing computers and expert systems to name a few. The question is
where in this range, a valid approach for a design machine could be positioned.
The exploration of the characteristic features of design, deployed in the previ-
ous chapter, demonstrated that the issue of representation is a fundamental
one in our inquiry on design machines. The research field of Artificial Intel-
ligence has been founded on the issue of representation and has to demon-
strate an important and relevant debate that has been going on over the last
50 years. During this period, the two main approaches that have dominated
the efforts on building intelligent systems are the "symbol systems" and "be-
havior based" approach (Rao 2002).
The symbol systems approach is based on the ability to store information
about the world in computer memory. The system usually contains hand-craft-
ed knowledge about the world expressed in some knowledge representation
language, for example if-then rules, frames, declarative statements etc. This
knowledge and the world description are used by a problem solving mecha-
nism to achieve some goal. The solution is passed to an execution module that
performs actual actions in the world to achieve the goal. The great successes
of this approach relied on the fact that digital computers are ideally suited to
manipulate symbols, i.e. to generate combinations of symbol-primitives and
logical operations.
There are several reasons why this approach is considered a valid one as far as
design machines are concerned. First it is based on the separation of reason-
ing from perception and action and on the assumption that knowledge and
the manipulation of knowledge can and should be separated from the physical
body of the system (Rao 2002). Second, it requires representations, descrip-
tions of the world, which are surrogates, substitutes for the actual phenom-
ena. Representations require determining consequences by thinking rather
than acting, that is, by reasoning about the world rather than taking action in
it.
For the needs of the current thesis, I will look at the behavior based approach
which argues in favor of intelligences that are being built through the interac-
tion of the system with the world.
[b] classification of machines
Moving towards computational systems that try alternative standpoints to
representation, I will set the background for my further exploration by looking
into a series of computational systems. I will question the "eligibility" of each
of them as a possible design machine, in terms of the design criteria previ-
ously stated. At the end of the chapter I will have outlined a classification of
machines through an additive bottom-up process from the most elemental
version of a machine to more complex ones.
Let's define a machine as an entity with an internal configuration. Such a defi-
nition presupposes the existence of an external environment in which the ma-
chine is situated. If the machine is not equipped either with an input channel
to receive a stimulus or with an output channel to give a response then there
is no interaction between the internal configuration of the machine and the
external environment. An example of such a machine that does not receive
any input, nor has an output to cause a change to the external environment is
the atomic clock, a device that uses atomic vibration to measure time.
Figure 13: The first atomic clock, con-
structed in 1949 by the US National
Bureau of Standards
The internal configuration of the atomic clock is comprised of three parts: a
crystal oscillator, a container of cesium-133 atoms and a detector. In an isolat-
ed, closed environment, by means of the crystal oscillator a microwave pulse
of a certain frequency is created which excites the cesium atoms; when the at-
oms are excited with the exactly desired frequency they change energy state.
The detector detects the change and locks the frequency of the oscillator to
the frequency that caused the change of the energy state. This sequence of
steps occurs in a continuous loop. This is an example of a system for which
every change of its internal state depends on its configuration and its isolated
internal environment; no change of its internal state is affected by external
conditions or acts in some way on the environment.
01 receptor machine
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the necessity for a design machine to
be equipped with sensory mechanisms which provide information about the
world. Therefore a system with an internal configuration that does not allow
any input of information and stimulus from the outside environment would
never constitute a valid approach for a design machine.
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Figure 14: The receptor machine,
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Let's equip a machine with input channels, receptors that enable its interaction
with the external environment (Figure 14). Receptors determine how events
in the external environment are related to the internal informational states of
the machine with the causal flow from the environment to the machine and
what kinds of organizations (perceptual categories, features, and primitives)
can be made on the environment (Cariani, 1998).
Stiny and Gips (1978, p. 19-31) in their book Algorithmic Aesthetics introduce
receptors as a basic part in their proposed framework for a design algorithm. A
receptor is what provides the sensory connection between the algorithm and
the outside world. It consists of two parts: a transducer(s) and a linked algo-
rithm. The transducer can be a sensor, camera or a traditional input device like
a keyboard or a mouse. The algorithm linked to the transducer produces a fi-
nite sequence of symbols as output based on what the transducer has sensed.
Since the system is sensing natural phenomena, the signal from being con-
tinuous gets discretized. No matter what the nature of the signal that passes
through the input channel (transducer) is - electric, electromagnetic, acoustic
etc - at a given moment the channel is characterized by a set of distinguishable
states. At each of the discrete moments in time, each channel will be found in
one or another of a finite number of possible states or conditions. These states
might be given any variety of symbolic names. This sequence of symbols is the
descriptions and the interpretations of initial conditions that are to be used to
make an object. To link this to our previous discussion these descriptions are
the set of vocabularies on which the design algorithm operates.
Stiny and Gips (1978, p. 14) make it clear that in their proposed framework the
conventions and criteria encoded in the design algorithms, which also include
the algorithms that convert the input signal to a finite sequence of symbols,
are static. They do not change over time; they correspond to some predefined
and fixed approach.
02 effector machine
Let's return to the initial assumption of a machine with an internal configura-
tion but with no interaction with the outside environment.
Design involves reorganization and physical manifestation of a changed order.
Therefore, a design machine should be able to act upon the environment and
apply a specific reorganization. To do so, it has to be equipped with output
channels that can influence the outside world, the effectors. An effector de-
termines how the internal informational states of the machine are related to
the external environment with the causal flow going from the machine to the
environment. Given some sequence of symbols as input, the effector performs
some action or produces some object in the external world.
Effectors are the other of the three main parts of the framework for a design
algorithm proposed by Stiny and Gips. They define an effector as the output
device of the system comprising an algorithm and a linked transducer. In a
design algorithm, the effector has as input the description of the object that is
to be produced. The nature of the transducer in the effector would depend on
the art form for which the design algorithm is constructed. Effectors might be
printers, CNC machines, and even robots (Stiny & Gips, 1978, p.201).
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An example of an effector machine is the digital fabrication system (Figure
16,17) used by Fabio Gramazio and Matthias Kohler to construct brick walls
with precisely controlled layouts. The system was composed of a design al-
gorithm that was acquiring the data for generating brick wall patterns from a
virtual simulation of falling spheres. The output of the algorithm was linked to
an 8-axis robotic arm which was precisely placing the bricks according to their
position and rotation.
Figure 16, 17: From the project "Non-Standardised Brick Fagade" by
Gramazio and Kohler, Gantenbein Vineyard Facade, Flssch (Switzer-
land), 2006
A reasonable criticism of this system, in terms of its validity as a design ma-
chine generator of surprises, would be that once the certain specifications and
the vocabularies on which the system operates are decided, then it becomes
closed, therefore no surprises are anticipated.
03 reaction machine
The exploration of the two previous two categories, the receptor and the ef-
fector machine, demonstrated that a design machine whose criterion is to gen-
erate surprise should include a combination of both receptors and effectors.
Let's now assume we have a machine equipped with both receptors and effec-
tors. However, it has no storage ability, no internal memory. It can only receive
a stimulus through its receptor and respond to the stimulus through its effec-
tor.
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Figure 18: The reaction machine
M I nternal equipped with both receptors and
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Let's consider as a typical example of such a reaction machine, the first types
of the series of the Braitenberg Vehicles. In his book Vehicles: Experiments
in Synthetic Psychology, the neuroanatomist Valentino Braitenberg (1984)
describes 13 conceptual constructions, which he calls "vehicles". Vehicles are
machines with a simple internal structure and simple control mechanisms.
The first and simplest vehicle has one sensor and one motor. The vehicle's sen-
sor is the receptor of the system that senses a specific quality and its motor is
its effector which reacts to the input of the sensor. The speed of the motor is
controlled by the sensor. The vehicle can move only forward; the more there is
of the quality the sensor is tuned the faster the motor goes.
..............
By gradually adding more machinery to the vehicles he is building more com-
plex behavior. Vehicles 2, 3 and 4 are equipped with two sensors to detect
the environment and two motors to propel themselves. The relationships
between the sensors and actuators determine the specific behavior for each
machine. By connecting simple motors to sensors, crossing wires and making
some of them inhibitory, simple machines can be constructed that show fear,
aggression, love, affection etc.
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Figure 19: Vehicles of the types
2 and 3. The relationships be-
tween motors and sensors de-
termine the behavior of the
vehicle.
Figure 20: Vehicle of type 3
with inhibitory influence of the
sensors on the motors.
It is important to mention that at the local level the internal configuration of
each simple reaction machine is what determines its specific behavior. The
structural connections of the sensors to the motors are predefined and desig-
nate how the vehicle will move when interacting with the source that "excites"
its sensors. Up to this level the behavior of the vehicle is predictable, maybe
even uninteresting; the vehicle will always be prisoner of the fixed topology
connections of its sensor to its motors. Braitenberg is incrementally building
more complex machines (from vehicle n.1 to vehicle n.4), with new behaviors
emerging each time by applying various combinations of the elemental to-
pological relation of vehicle 1. However once the topological connections for
every machine are decided and set then it becomes a closed system.
What makes this computational system relevant to the design machine ex-
ploration is that the interesting behavior (and this, as already mentioned, de-
pends only in the eye of an outside observer) emerges through the interaction
of the machine with its external environment. The external environment might
comprise the sources that affect the vehicle's sensors as well as the other ve-
hicles that coexist. When moving to the global scale of the observed behavior
then there is no inherent central representation, no predefined vocabulary
and structure in the way the vehicles are going to behave which is imposed or
predefined, but through the continual exchange of information, unexpected
behavior emerges. The vehicles demonstrate how interesting behavior can
emerge out of the interaction of a set of simple machines operating without
Figure 21- 24: Tissue Software (2002) by C.E.B. Reas, the project explores the move-
ments of synthetic neural systems. People affect the software by positioning a group
of points on the screen.
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centralized control. The global system remains open by setting the machines
operate in a dynamic environment where new behavior can be determined
and additional channels of interpretation for the observer can be opened.
An implemented example based on the Braitenberg conceptions is the Tissue
Software built by the artist C.E.B. Reas. Reas (2007) developed his software
with the intention to create an open field where "the material form as well as
the semantic content is open". His work demonstrates how out of simple reac-
tion machines in a dynamic changing environment unexpected patterns of vi-
sual form can emerge (Figure 20-24). He writes "Simple layers of code combine
to create the deceptively complicated behavior of these software machines".
The word "deceptively" brings into the discussion the notion of the black box
machine. The observer at the beginning cannot predict the global behavior of
the system. However after a while, by interacting with the system gain a cer-
tain degree of understanding of how the system works.
Since the system operates via simple reflexive input and output signals, its
behavior is a prisoner of its immediate external inputs. In order to move a
reflexive system at a higher level of complexity and introduce possibilities of
unexpected behavior, an elementary form of memory should be added.
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04 memory machine
The memory machine (Figure 25) is a system capable of interacting with the
environment through receptors and effectors. It has an elementary ability of
storage so that it can operate based on memory dependent mappings. Since
memory dependent mappings are present, the system becomes less depen-
dent on its immediate past input (case of the reaction) and more dependent
on its recent history (Cariani, 1998).
A typical example of this category is GROPE, an Architecture Machine Group
project developed by Steven Gregory (Figure 26). Grope was a machine able of
interfacing with the real world. It was a mobile unit that could crawl over maps.
It was equipped with a "seeing" mechanism constructed by simple photocells
that could register on or off states according to whether they could identify
light or not. Grope's role was to look for "interesting things". It compared its
past to its present location and that determined its future move. It occasion-
ally employed random numbers to avoid rats (Negroponte, 1970, p. 109-110).
Once more "unexpected" behavior depends on the eye of the observer. The
observer looks at the behavior of GROPE to identify "interesting" things rather
that receiving a testimony on what is interesting or not. GROPE was developed
as one of the first appendages to an architecture machine because it is an in-
terface that explores the real world (Negroponte, 1970, p. 109).
Figure 26-29:
GROPE by Steven Gregory,
Architecture Machine Group
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Another example of the action-reaction relationship but with elementary
storage ability comes from Rodney Brook's Subsumption architecture. Brooks
builds "Creatures" autonomous mobile agents who can demonstrate low-lev-
el intelligence. Adopting an alternative view to representation from the tradi-
tional Al symbol systems approach, Brooks (1991) proposes that intelligence
should be built incrementally through the interaction of the system with the
world through perception and action.
A characteristic feature of the Subsumption architecture is it being composed
of layers, each layer built on top of the others. The layers are combined through
mechanisms of suppression and inhibition. For example in the system of Fig-
ure 30 there are three layers of control. The first and lowest layer of control
makes sure that the robot avoids static and dynamic obstacles; the second lay-
er imbues the robot with the ability to wander around; the third layer makes
the robot try to explore. Each layer is composed of a fixed-topology network
of simple finite state machines. The finite state machines run asynchronously,
sending and receiving fixed length messages over wires.
The model of the subsumption architecture has some elements that seem rel-
evant to a design machine. The system operates under no central representa-
tion interfacing "directly to the world through perception and action" (Brooks,
1991). According to Brooks by exploiting the complexity of the environment is
possible to build systems that can "lead to complex behavior with non-central-
ized representations of the world".
For the scope of this thesis a design machine has been defined in terms of
its ability to generate surprises, thus being a black box to its observer. The
proposed framework wants the machine to generate its own dynamic descrip-
tions. A design machine built out of multiple layers of finite state machines, as
in the subsumption architecture, might be able to generate the conditions for
a complex behavior to emerge through the interaction with the environment.
However it will not be possible for the system to form descriptions on which,
it could apply meaning and eventually manage to learn, out of interfacing with
the real world. It will manage at the beginning to surprise its observer but
soon its behavior will become anticipated given that it will be always depen-
dent on the topological connections of the different levels.
05 intrinsic representation machine
We reached a point where we need a system that has enough memory to
store information in addition to the receptors and the effectors by which it
interfaces with the real world. Its distinctive characteristic is its ability to form
descriptions intrinsically about the external environment, "entities" that bear
content independent of our interpretations.
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This category was named after the intrinsic representation model built by
Stephen Larson (2003). Larson proposes with his work that meanings can be
learned by computational systems without explicit instruction. He believes
that computational systems should be able to form their own representations
of the world and he takes a step towards that direction by showing how de-
scriptions can be build up from low level sensory information by making statis-
tical distinctions between similar and dissimilar input.
He actually built a working system which successfully learns to associate sym-
bols to blocks in a simple 2d blocks world and to associate the position of the
eye with the position of its arm.
The intrinsic representation machine seems a valid approach to start as far as
design machines are concerned. It satisfies both the conditions set in chapter
2. First, it is a system that is equipped with receptors and effectors therefore
it can observe its phenomenon and eventually act on it. Second it suggests a
possible direction on how a system could form dynamic descriptions, sets of
vocabularies that could be continuously changing.
PART 04 A step towards intrinsic descriptions
[a] zooming into the machine-environment interaction
The first three parts of the current thesis were an inquiry meant to detect
a valid approach for a design machine in order for it to constitute a creative
partner in the designer-machine relationship. The criterion introduced as a
precondition, taking into account the nature of the design process, was the
element of surprise. With this criterion in mind, I demonstrated (chapter 3)
why it is necessary for a design machine to be capable of sensing its exter-
nal environment and forming intrinsic descriptions about the world, "entities"
that bear content independent of our interpretations. At the end of chapter
3, 1 presented a framework for a design machine that includes the concept of
dynamic descriptions.
To briefly summarize, the proposed framework is about a computational sys-
tem equipped with receptors, sensory mechanisms that enable the system to
sense its environment continuously. The machine decomposes the observed
phenomenon to discrete parts and generates its own descriptions. Then, the
system applies one or a series of transformations operating on the generated
vocabulary and an artifact is produced. This sequence of steps occurs over
and over again; the system looks back at the artifact and generates the same
or new sets of vocabularies. New transformations are applied on the evolving
artifact. This recursive process goes on until the evolving artifact reaches a
satisfactory state.
n C
decomposition a transformations
..-- 
-
-- dd
dynamic set of
p rn descritpions f
c
d artifact
phenomenon ''. .- '
fusion
Figure 32: The proposed framework for a design machine
This chapter focuses on a specific part of this loop. It experiments on a pos-
sible way by which the design machine can algorithmically decompose what
it senses from the outside world. The sensory mechanism under investiga-
tion is the machine's vision. Negroponte (1970) believed that the first sensory
mechanism to be incorporated in an architecture machine would be a seeing
mechanism. He writes: "At first, machines with eyes will observe simple physi-
cal models; eventually they will observe real environments" (Negroponte,
1970, p.29).
For the need of the current experiment the machine's "eye" will observe still
images with an aspiration similar to Negroponte's vision that at a later stage
the machine will observe real environments. The interest for the machine be-
ing able to sense the world lies on the desire to build a system that will gener-
ate its own descriptions about its environment. As a possible computational
model to use as the infrastructure for my development, I will selected the re-
search work of Stephen Larson (2003) who was the first to have a system in-
trinsically grounding symbols in perception.
[b] Larson's model of Intrinsic Representation
Stephen Larson (2003) with his model of intrinsic representation takes a step
towards understanding how meanings can be learned by a computational sys-
tem without explicit instruction. With his implementation he demonstrates
how symbols can emerge from a system that receives low-level perceptual
information through its sensors and without supervision discovers regularities
in that information.
I will briefly explain how his implemented system works. Two sensory systems
receive streams of data from the outside world. The data is organized by a
sub-system of two self-organizing maps, which organizes them with respect to
their similarity, placing similar regularities in proximity, and dissimilar regulari-
ties farther apart (Larson, 2003, p. 37). When the map reaches a specific crite-
rion of self-organization the system uses a clustering algorithm to separate the
major clusters in space (Larson, 2003, p. 48). Once grouped, a cluster gains the
ability to act as a unit that can be activated and deactivated.
Each of the two sets of information, the visual input from the system's "eye"
and the input of the system's arm, is organized by a separate self-organizing
map. As clusters are activated by the incoming data in the two parallel maps,
they are associated together by their frequency of coincidence. The more
often two clusters are active simultaneously, the more associated they are
(Larson, 2003, p. 37). Through this model Larson built a successfully working
implementation of a system capable of learning symbols for blocks in a blocks
world and capable of associating the movement of the system's eye with the
movement of the system's arm.
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Figure 33: Larson's model
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[c] On classification
The theory on which Larson (2003) builds his computational model is that the
information the brain collects about the environment in order to form sym-
bols contains statistically detectable patterns. Brains must reduce the informa-
tional entropy coming from its sensory mechanisms. In other words, in order
for the brain to make sense of the world out of the significant amounts of
information it collects, it manages to find relationships among the informa-
tion it receives and filter out the irrelevant information (Larson, 2003, p.40).
Negroponte (1966, p. 4) in his Master thesis in 1966, also argued in favor of the
approach that the eye and mind work like a computer proceeding through a
complicated process of input, working on the information and finally organiz-
ing it to be intelligible input, at a much faster rate than the most sophisticated
data process equipment.
I will use an example to illustrate Larson's and Negroponte's point of view.
Let's assume that we are looking at a line drawing of a square on a white sheet
of paper. Even though what we identify is the figure of a square, there is in
fact an infinity of other configurations that could have produced the same set
of lines. An explanation of why we do not notice all these alternatives could
be the restricted storage capacity of our visual memory; to compensate for
that our visual system chooses to identify a specific organization on the bare
perceptual input. The inability of our perceptual system to store and process
large amounts of information is evident also when we first try to identify the
organization of a very complex pattern. We can probably get a vague idea of its
organization but we cannot "photograph" its total configuration.
Design is a process very closely associated to perception. In order for the de-
signer to be able to organize matter, is necessary to generate a description of
what he sees, in other words to apply some kind of initial organization. The act
of creating descriptions is a way of gaining control over the large amount of
input that enters the designer's perceptual system; this organization further
enables him to "handle" the information and reorganize it. Taking these points
under consideration self-organization algorithms seems a promising computa-
tional model for experimenting with how a design machine could intrinsically
make sense of the outside world.
[b] experimenting with self-organization
In this part, I will describe an experiment on implementing a self-organizing
map algorithm intended to classify the visual data from a two dimensional
image. I will outline the algorithm's pseudo code so that the reader can follow
and understand the process. Then I will demonstrate the an example run of
the algorithm on a black and white image.
Instead of working on the pixel level of the image, limiting the system to "read"
only r-g-b color values, I chose to experiment classifying fragmented parts of
the image. Working with fragments offers the flexibility to define various prop-
erties through which the system is able to "read" the fragment. These opera-
tions provide to the system with the data to be classified by the self-organizing
algorithm.
Figure 15 is the key diagram for understanding the process of the implement-
ed algorithm. The image is divided in a number of fragments, which is deter-
mined by the user of the algorithm. The algorithm runs a property operation
on a selected fragment and an n-dimensional vector, a set of numbers that
describe the fragment in terms of the property under investigation, is gener-
ated. This n-dimensional vector, is the sample vector that is being classified
--------- --
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Figure 34: From an image to a self-organizing map
by the self-organizing algorithm. This sequence occurs for the total number of
the fragments.
I will first define what I mean by property operation and then I will briefly
explain what a self-organizing map is and how it works. Having clarified the
various parts of the system I will describe the pseudo code of the algorithm
and demonstrate the example run.
01 Property operations
The first natural question that arises is how the system interprets its visual
input, which for the requirements of this experiment is a two-dimensional
image. As already mentioned I chose to examine processes that interpret an
image in terms of its pixels. However instead of limiting the system to "read"
only r-g-b color values, I decided to look at operations that could provide a
description about parts of the image.
Shimon Ullman (1996, p. 278) proposes that the visual system in order to per-
ceive shape properties and spatial relationships assembles "visual routines"
using sequences of basic elementary operations. By further combining these
basic operations using different sequences it composes new visual routines
mechanisms for different properties and relations. Motivated by Ullman's
research work I tried to identify basic operations by which the system could
interpret the fragments from the image. I would like to clarify that my inten-
tion is not to identify operations that will mimic the human visual system; it is
rather an effort to explore how basic operations that are being used for years
in the computer vision research field could be imported in a self-organization
system. Some possible basic operations could be:
> Mapping of the red-green-blue color values of the fragment.
> Calculating the ratio of the black and white pixels of a fragment characterizes
the contrast of an image.
> Calculating the "uniformity" of an image; every pixel is allocated a score ac-
cording to whether its nearest neighbors are of the same or different color.
> Identifying connectivity; the operation starts from a single pixel and by check-
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ing its nearest neighbors and the neighbors' neighbors can track boundaries of
the object. The same operation could be used to identify spatial relations like
e.g. enclosure.
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Figure 35: the r, g, b values of every pixel of the fragment are mapped in an array that
represent the property vector of the fragment. The number of values to be stored to
the list is equal to the number of dimensions inserted to the system.
source image inpt sampl a pixel andfragment its neighbor pixels
Figure 36: operation that scores every pixel of the fragment according to the number
of neighbors that have the same color. For example, the pixel (x,y) of the diagram
would be scored with 3.
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02 Self-organizing map
Self-organizing maps (SOMs) are a computational model that creates a visual
representation of a large body of data. The produced representation allows
relationships in that data to become observable to a human viewer (Larson,
2003). An SOM arranges data by performing an incremental statistical analysis
on the information it receives; it plots the similarities of the data by grouping
similar data items together. It compresses information while preserving the
most important topological and metric relationships of the primary data items.
In my implementation I used the basic form of an SOM, consisting of a two-di-
mensional regular grid of nodes. The map is populated with a number of cells
which in our experiment is equal to the number of fragments in which the
input image has been divided in. Each cell of the map is associated to a weight
vector of equal dimensions to that of the sample vector of a fragment. Initially,
the weights of the vector are randomly generated. At every step, the sample
vector goes through all the weight vectors and calculates the metric distance
between itself and each weight vector. The one with the shortest distance will
be the winner cell.
The weights of the winner cell and of its neighbor cells will be updated ac-
cording to a learning function to better match the sample vector. This process
repeats for all the sample vectors available. The learning rate is reduced as the
learning process evolves. The learning function is:
m,(t+1) = m,(t)+a(t)[x(t)-m,(t)]
where m, is the target vector for node i, x is the sample vector, a is the learning
rate and t is a discrete time coordinate.
Next, I demonstrate the pseudocode of the SOM algorithm. The code was de-
veloped in JAVA using the Processing library for the visualization of the pro-
cess.
to initialize and set up a self-organizing map:
* initialize a matrix of height and width equal
to the number of fragments of the image in
the y and x dimension
* populate the matrix with nodes
e allocated each node with a vector with ran-
dom weights - the number of weights of ev-
ery vector should be equal with the number
of dimensions the property vector of the
fragment has
For every fragment of the image:
* find the winner node whose weight vector
best matches the property vector of the
fragment comparing the euclidean distance
e attach the fragment to the winner node to
enable the visualization of the process
* discover which are the nodes surrounding
the winner node
* update the weights of the winner node and
of its neighbor nodes according to the learn-
ing function
This sequence of steps repeats for all the frag-
ments available for a defined number of itera-
tions until the training criterion is reached
input image
5 x 6 fragments
self-organizing map
width
for example: matrix 5x6
Figure 37
Figure 18 demonstrates an example run of the SOM algorithm on the frag-
ments of an input black and white image. These frames are selected from a
run series of one-thousand (1000) iterations. From the very first iterations one
can see that the fragments start to organize into separate regions of similar
brightness. As iterations progress the regions with dark and the ones with light
fragments become more distinctly separate. One can see that the last frames
are very similar to each other since, as the discrete time coordinate increases
the learning rate decreases and the self-organizing map algorithm converges
to on specific organization, as intended.
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wFigure 38:
Self-organization of the
input image we see below
image resolution:
300x210
fragment resolution:
10 x 10
number of iterations:
1000
n-dimensions of each
property vector: 100
The next step after the
map has reached a level
of organization is to run
a clustering algorithm
which would recognize
the groupings in the or-
ganized data.
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Contributions
In this thesis I have:
" introduced surprise as a design criterion for a design machine
" proposed a computational framework for a design machine able of perceiv-
ing its environment and of forming intrinsic descriptions. A key characteristic
of the proposed framework is that through the constant interaction of the
design machine with the environment the descriptions generated can be con-
stantly changing. My suggestion is that such a feature is a step closer to build-
ing design machines capable of creative activity.
e I outlined a classification of machines with an alternative approach to repre-
sentation from simpler to more complex. I examined every case in terms of its
eligibility as a design machine.
* suggested a use of self-organizing maps implementation in the domain of
design
Conclusive remarks
The "classical" - "non-classical" distinction, some years ago, motivated my in-
terest in computation. That distinction was meant to distinguish the paradigm
of modern thought in architecture, the classical thought, as associated with
closed strategies for arriving at predetermined goals (Eisenman, 1984). At that
point it seemed to me that computation could provide the means to release
architectural form and the design process from the remains of the classical
paradigm, any kind of origins, types, ideals that were associated to a priori
sets of values.
Some years later, another distinction between the "classical" and the "non-
classical" in terms of computation this time (Knight, Stiny, 1991), provided me
with another important insight. The danger of closed strategies that impede
novelty can as well exist in the realm of computation when using digital tools
that operate on fixed units of description and strong hierarchies. This realiza-
tion was the reason for this thesis; it formed my interest in exploring possible
ways by which computational tools can be creative partners in design. It led
me to envision design machines as black boxes, generators of surprises for
their designers-observers. It was an effort to move again to the non-classical:
to the dynamic instead of the static, the pluralistic instead of the monolithic,
to look for multiple ideas instead of ideals. Looking for ideas requires form
appearing and disappearing momentarily. So design mechanisms that would
trigger surprises for their observers, should allow divergence and changing
vocabularies in continuum.
Having set the framework of a design machine capable of forming dynamic
descriptions, the first step was to focus on how the computational system can
algorithmically decompose a phenomenon into discrete parts. The computa-
tional model of self-organization I experimented on seems promising and it
definitely provides directions for future research. One important direction is to
explore how different self organizing maps that run at the same time classify-
ing different properties of the same object could be associated in a meaningful
way.
This approach could provide the machine with the ability to learn how to gen-
erate primitives in an unsupervised manner. However I would like to mention
that on the first place trying to define the basic operations, the properties by
which the machine in our case "reads" an image, is a way to define explicitly
how the machine interprets a phenomenon. It happens at a very elemental
level but still is a way of predefining closed loops between the machine and
the environment. The possibility of unexpected, surprising behaviors to ap-
pear depend from that point on, on the unexpected associations and the fact
that the machine eventually will exist in a real complex environment.
Another possible scenario for experimentation would be to rethink the cycli-
cal process of interaction among the machine and the environment. As it is
proposed in the course of the thesis, is characterized by the notion of a cen-
tral system with perceptual modules as inputs and action modules as outputs.
The important difference is that the symbolic description of the world is not
hand crafted by the designer of the machine but intrinsically generated by the
system through the interaction with the environment which for the moment
includes only its ability to "see". However it takes "a long chain of modules to
connect perception to action" (Brooks, 1991). Maybe a direction for future
research could explore Brooks' approach (1991) on decomposing a system
without making distinctions between peripheral systems, such as vision, and
central systems, but instead built layers of activities.
I will conclude by bringing back the concept of intrinsic descriptions and my
remark that predefining the elemental operations the machine uses to inter-
pret a phenomenon restricts the behavior of the system. The concept of build-
ing intrinsic descriptions and changing primitives implies "a form of learning
of new categories rather than learning within existing categories" (Varela, as
cited in Cariani, 1998). This leaves me with the aspiration: Would it be possible
for the system to learn how to build its own interpretation operations rather
than having them defined in advance?
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